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Abstract: 
Labour’s second landslide victory of 2001 seemed inevitable given the almost 
continuous public support for the government through its first term.  This paper 
considers the ways in which the party attempted to maintain and cultivate the 
electorate’s backing during the last four weeks or ‘short’ campaign.  Perhaps 
fearing apathy more than the Conservatives Labour launched ‘Operation 
Turnout’ in order to mobilise its core supporters.  Though this attempt failed to 
boost electoral participation the party nevertheless achieved another major 
victory.  In this so-called ‘apathetic landslide’ Labour was able to strategically 
outmanoeuvre their principal opponents the Conservatives.  Interestingly the 
more telling and potentially compromising criticisms of government policy and 
party procedure came from sympathisers.  These and other points will be 
examined with recourse to a marketing analysis of the Labour campaign. 
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 Introduction. 
In winning the 2001 general election Labour did better than in 1997 given it 
now had a four year record in office to defend.  That said the party had used 
its first period to demonstrate its administrative competence and 
simultaneously maintain its lead in the public opinion polls.  This together with 
a good economic outlook, ineffectual Conservative opposition and favourable 
press coverage made re-election a strong possibility.  The campaign, when it 
began, did little alter this perception.   
 
This paper will explore Labour’s ‘short’ general election campaign of 2001 (i.e. 
the traditional four weeks of debate before polling day).  Inevitably this relates 
to the party’s earlier strategic formulations (for more on these see Seyd, 
2001).  This is because it is often said that Britain, like many other modern 
states, is now experiencing the permanent campaign.  Politicians, be they in 
office or opposition, are constantly engaged in attempts to communicate and 
convince electors of the worth of their proposals as well as themselves.  In 
doing so they draw heavily on marketing theories, techniques and personnel.  
The process has, for good or ill, now colonised campaigning (Wring, 1999).  
Consequently it is useful to apply a conventional marketing framework in 
analysing the dynamics of an election strategy such as Labour’s in 2001.   
 
 
Analysing a Political Marketing Campaign. 
The political marketing process embodies four components, namely the 
party (or candidate) organisation, the environment it operates within, the 
strategy pursued, and the market competed in (for a longer discussion see 
Wring, 1997).  On the latter Gamble contends that:  'The main components 
of the modern political market are three; the existence of a mass electorate; 
competition between two or more parties for the votes of this electorate; and 
a set of rules governing this competition' (Gamble,1974,p.6).  In an electoral 
context the concept of environment involves consideration of:  economic 
trends such as unemployment levels and consumer confidence; events of 
domestic or international importance; the reach and partisanship of select 
mass media; and the organisational competence and resources of their 
opponents.   
 
In contrast to market and environmental considerations that constitute the 
'givens', Hunt (1976) identifies the ‘controllable’ factors as the collection of 
strategic decisions that an organisation implements as part of its marketing 
programme.  Together these variables are commonly known as the 'mix', a 
configuration that consists of the ‘4Ps’: product, promotion, place and price.  
The first ‘P’ is central to any marketing effort.  In electoral terms the ‘product’ 
or offering is itself a ‘mix’ of variables in its own right and combines three key 
aspects:  party image, leader image and policy commitments (Worcester 
1991).   
 
The concept of party image encompasses factors such as the organisation’s 
record in office, recent history and unity of purpose (Harrop and Shaw 1990).  
Once a largely ignored factor in electoral research, the growing and 
importance of leader image has been recognised in studies into the 
increasing presidentialisation of British politics (Foley, 2000; Mughan, 2000).  
Underpinning the product is the policy platform on which an election 
manifesto is based.  This is increasingly significant given psephological 
research has begun to place greater emphasis on the rational choice notion 
of the elector as a consumer evaluating the issues and voting for the party 
most in tune with individual policy preferences (Denver, 1994).   
 
Promotions form the most obvious part of a marketing campaign.  The 
promotional mix can be divided into two principal parts commonly referred to 
as ‘controlled’ and ‘free’ media.  The first term covers all forms of 
advertising, be they poster, print or broadcast forms.  In politics those 
responsible are often termed ‘image makers’.  Free media refers to the 
publicity which parties get through mass media coverage.  Inevitably 
organisations have less control over this kind of exposure.  Consequently 
strategists, not to mention the voting public, tend to view this kind of 
coverage as being of greater importance than advertising.  This in part 
accounts for the rise of the ubiquitous ‘spin doctors’ responsible for public 
relations and news management functions (Franklin, 1994; Jones, 1995).   
 
At the heart of a ‘placement’ or distribution strategy is a network of regional 
suppliers.  In politics the equivalent form of organisation is the party at sub-
national level.  It helps co-ordinate volunteer labour in order to identify and 
mobilise potential supporters during election campaigns (Denver and Hands 
1997).  It should be noted that, precisely because it is a political marketing 
“mix”, some of the activities that may constitute part of one variable or ‘P’ 
can be found in another.  In this way the methods of the distribution policy 
closely mirror those of a promotional strategy in that both are reliant on tools 
such as direct mail despite having different aims.   
 
‘Pricing’, the fourth part of a conventional marketing mix, enables a 
commercial firm to develop a strategy that will help maintain competitiveness 
and profitability in the marketplace.  Niffenegger (1989) justifies the electoral 
relevance of the pricing mix by outlining its constituent parts.  These 
elements, relating to environmental phenomena as interpreted by the 
electorate, comprise voter feelings of national, economic and psychological 
hope or insecurity.   
 
Depending on the audience being targeted, common economic themes 
include the opponents’ intention to either raise tax and spending or else 
make sweeping budget cuts.  In times of international insecurity or domestic 
uncertainty politicians, particularly incumbents, often stress their rivals’ 
apparent lack of diplomacy or administrative competence.  Such appeals are 
often couched in images which stress the need to counter what is posed as 
a threat to the ‘national interest’ from ‘undesirable elements’ be they at home 
or abroad.  The other element in the pricing mix relates to the psychological 
cost implicit in voting.  A popular feature in negative campaigns, such 
strategies tap unspoken prejudices about a given politician's lack of ability, 
judgement and trustworthiness.   
 ‘Pricing’ policy need not necessarily form a wholly negative part of the 
political marketing mix.  It is possible to conceive of a campaign strategy that 
promotes the idea of a domestic ‘feelgood factor’ or psychological notions of 
‘a nation at ease with itself’ in their attempt to secure re-election.  Despite 
the fact that pricing is the least tangible aspect of a marketing strategy, it is 
nevertheless a useful concept that complements the other variables.  
Precisely because it is a ‘mix’, pricing can be seen to interlock and overlap 
with the other strategic tools, particularly those concerned with promotional 
and product management.  Marketing can be analysed in its constituent 
parts but should ultimately be seen in its totality.   
 
 
The ‘Givens’:  the political environment. 
An ongoing foot and mouth epidemic devastating British agriculture caused 
Prime Minister Tony Blair to think about delaying the widely anticipated May 
general election.  Initially seen as a major dilemma the decision to postpone 
made little difference to the outcome.  An undoubted rural crisis, the 
catastrophe blighting farming dominated headlines throughout April.  The 
controversy over the government’s handling of the problem did not, however, 
damage Labour’s standing in the polls.  On the contrary the party continued to 
benefit from good press coverage together with its reputation for economic 
competence.  Labour’s lead remained almost constant in a way it had 
throughout the parliament.  By contrast the Conservatives and their leader 
William Hague conspicuously failed to attract little public sympathy or media 
interest (Wring, 2001).  The party still appeared to be suffering the 
consequences of its landslide 1997 defeat.   
 
The Conservatives’ lamentable position continued despite Hague imposing his 
authority over the Central Office headquarters if not the parliamentary party.  
The leader facilitated the appointment of loyal aides Amanda Platell and 
Sebastian Coe to the key positions of Director of Communications and Chief of 
Staff.  Neither had considerable experience of managing a national election 
campaign.  Nor did their pre-campaign preparations make any significant dent 
in the Labour lead.  Following the Prime Minister’s announcement of the 
election, the Sun published a devastatingly stark poll suggesting the 
government could be re-elected with an increased majority of around 300.  
Though exaggerated the story underlined the thankless task facing the 
Conservatives. 
 
 
Party Organisation:  the Millbank machine. 
The party’s headquarters in Millbank Tower in central London where were 
once again central to Labour’s preparations for the election.  Approximately 
200 members of staff helped co-ordinate the campaign (Wintour, 2001).  The 
hub of operations was the so-called ‘war room’, an open plan office layout 
showcased by the US Democrats in the 1992 presidential race and adopted by 
Labour in the run-up to the 1997 election.  It was designed to break down 
hierarchies and allow the free flow of information between different sub-units 
(Gould, 1998).  This was particularly important given Labour was now in 
government and required a means of co-ordinating communication between 
ministers and the rest of the party.  Potential problems of this sort were 
alleviated by the fact that almost everybody involved was a veteran of the 
1997 campaign and many more had experience dating back long before then. 
 
Tony Blair as party leader was nominally head of the election operation.  
Given Blair was also the main campaigner he was unable to personally 
manage and oversee the campaign.  That said his authority within the party 
was such that he was able to delegate decision-making duties to a number of 
his close aides and colleagues.  The most senior of these people, the 
Chancellor Gordon Brown, acted as Chair of Election Strategy.  He oversaw 
the development of the so-called ‘war book’, the document containing all the 
party’s plans and preparations for the campaign.  Brown had undertaken this 
role in the 1997 election.  That experience obviously proved as useful as 
Labour’s huge lead in the opinion polls was reassuring.   
 
Reflecting on the creative tension within their relationship, the Sun newspaper 
perhaps ominously described Blair and Brown as the ‘Lennon and McCartney’ 
of British politics.  Nonetheless the absence from the campaign of Peter 
Mandelson, formerly the Prime Minister’s closest adviser and a rival of Brown, 
removed a potential source of conflict between the two men.  The MP for 
Hartlepool had previously served as Campaign Co-ordinator in 1997 and was 
expected to play a major role this time.  His two ministerial resignations made 
his position untenable and his duties were given to Douglas Alexander.  
Alexander, a Scottish MP and ally of Brown, had previously helped manage 
the party’s first post-devolution election effort north of the border.  Other 
politicians with significant roles included Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott 
spearheaded his own tour of the regions.   
 
While there was a large degree of continuity in the parliamentary leadership, 
headquarters had seen some major changes in personnel since the 1997 
victory.  Many involved in that campaign either went into government or 
lobbying jobs.  Most significantly Tom Sawyer, the party’s General Secretary 
and in effect its chief executive, departed for a seat in the Lords.  He was 
replaced by Margaret McDonagh, the official who had co-ordinated the 
successful 1997 key marginal seats’ strategy.  In post McDonagh managed 
and oversaw practical preparations for the campaign.  Former BBC political 
correspondent and Downing Street press officer Lance Price switched to 
Millbank where he became Director of Communications with responsibility for 
co-ordinating media relations.  Working alongside him was Spencer Livermore, 
head of the so-called Rapid Rebuttal IT system purposefully designed to 
answer and deflect opposition attacks.  They played key roles as did Greg 
Cook, the official responsible for the collation and monitoring of opinion 
research data.  
 
Besides the politicians and permanent officials, the Millbank operation also 
drew on the expertise of other professionals.  The Prime Minister’s Press 
Secretary Alastair Campbell spent some of the campaign at headquarters as 
did other Downing Street colleagues like Pat McFadden.  Labour’s long time 
marketing consultant and Blair’s polling adviser Philip Gould once again 
supervised a programme of qualitative research in the form of focus groups.  
Other veterans of previous campaigns such as lobbyists David Hill and Colin 
Byrne helped with the party’s public relations efforts.  The party’s advertising 
account was awarded to the agency TBWA.  It obviously helped that one of 
the firm’s senior executives was Trevor Beattie, a longstanding Labour 
sympathiser and high profile figure within the industry.   
 
Given Blair’s close relationship with the Clinton administration and Millbank’s 
adoption of the Democrats’ ‘war room’ it was not a surprise that, once again, 
the party took soundings from various American political consultants.  Gould, 
for instance, worked with fellow polling expert Stan Greenberg (Freedland, 
2001).  Other key Clinton aides like James Carville and Sidney Blumenthal 
were also reported to have been involved.  Clearly these were the people who 
might be able to help Labour understand the lessons of the highly dramatic 
presidential race of 2000. 
 
The ‘Controllables’:  policy positioning. 
Labour’s manifesto ‘Ambitions for Britain’ signalled the government’s desire to 
continue what its first term had begun.  The document did, however, recognise 
the challenge of reviewing the management and delivery of core public 
services.  Labour proposed to remedy this through so-called public private 
partnerships.  Here they envisaged the involvement of private companies 
would help revitalise the provision of a range of services.  These included the 
highly sensitive and salient topics of health and education.   
 
Labour made public its key priorities by once again adopting the five pledge 
format from its 1997 campaign.  Each commitment helps identify key aspects 
of the party brand and whom it saw as its main target audiences.  With the 
exception of the last, all could be regarded as belonging to ‘middle England’, a 
code for aspirational middle-class homeowners living in the English suburbs of 
the south and midlands.  The first pledge on mortgages, inflation and sound 
public finances reflected Gordon Brown’s well known pre-occupation with 
market friendly policies.  Perhaps aware of Al Gore’s perceived inability to 
capitalise on the Democrats’ record during the recent US presidential race, 
Labour were in effect adopting the Clintonite mantra ‘It’s the Economy, Stupid’ 
by promoting the government’s financial prudence.  Another target was City 
opinion; it was courted with a special manifesto for business.  In 2001 this 
strategy appeared to have results when the Economist magazine offered its 
support for Blair as the only ‘credible conservative’ and The Times endorsed 
Labour for the first time in its history because the government was 
‘consolidating’ the Thatcher legacy.   
 By contrast with the pledge on economic management, the commitment to 
maintain winter fuel payments for pensioners and the minimum wage was the 
only one to explicitly appeal to those in poverty or in danger of being socially 
excluded.  The other three promises addressed the problems of public 
services by committing resources to the recruitment of thousands of extra 
nurses, doctors, police officers and teachers.  The pledge on education also 
referred to improving school standards and, like the others, was clearly aimed 
at those families heavily reliant on public service provision.  This and other 
related themes were revisited in Your Family, a women’s magazine styled 
publication which used celebrities to promote government achievements.  This 
and other publicity material highlighted Labour positioning on what strategist 
Douglas Alexander claimed were the party’s key campaign issues of pensions, 
education and health (Freedland, 2001). 
 
The Conservatives faced a key difficulty in responding to Labour on public 
services as they broadly agreed on the need for greater private sector 
involvement within the sector.  There were differences in policy but these 
nuances were difficult to explain to an apparently disengaged public.  By 
contrast prominent Labour sympathisers such as Mirror columnist Paul 
Routledge attacked the plans for ushering in the ‘invasion of private profit’.  
Practical electoral opposition to these proposals came from smaller parties as 
well as the Kidderminster based Health Concern group whose independent 
candidate actually managed to unseat a minister and win the local Wyre 
Forest constituency. 
 Other possible campaign issues like support for the proposed US Nuclear 
Missile Defence were neutralised by bipartisanship combined with deft 
manoeuvres by government spokespeople.  The same could be said of the 
Dome, a project instigated by the previous Conservative government.  
Douglas Alexander summarised the Conservatives’ positioning as being based 
around the issues of asylum, tax cuts and the Euro (Freedland, 2001; see also 
Gould, 2001).  These were the essence of a pricing strategy aimed at 
exploiting prejudice within the national psyche and appealing to more base 
economic motives.  The Conservative approach appeared to have limited 
resonance with the electorate.  Labour did its best to ensure this remained the 
case.  Most obviously the thorny issue of the Single European Currency, on 
which the government was perceived to be out of touch with public opinion, 
was largely neutralised by the renewed commitment to have a referendum 
before any possible British entry.   
 
The effective ‘non-decision’ on the Euro underlined the marketing driven 
nature of Labour’s strategic thinking.  Despite reportedly wanting further 
European integration Blair was careful not to expose himself on this matter, 
even publicising his promise not to ‘bounce’ Britain into the Single Currency in 
the best selling daily and highly sceptical Sun newspaper.  Conservative 
claims that any subsequent referendum would involve a rigged question 
smacked of desperation given the relative simplicity of this yes/no issue.  
Hague’s subsequent decision to campaign to ‘Save the Pound’ was perhaps 
churlish and ultimately futile. 
 Like the Euro the Conservatives’ attempt to capitalise on the asylum debate 
brought little apparent electoral reward.  Labour politicians, notably Home 
Secretary Jack Straw, had long responded with authoritarian rhetoric and 
policies on this particular topic.  Indeed Conservative leader Hague’s 
controversial pre-election speech in which he referred to Britain becoming a 
‘foreign land’ was itself later attacked by Liberal Democrat Simon Hughes 
following serious race related disturbances in Oldham during the campaign.  
This particular inter-party dispute meant that it was more difficult for the 
Conservatives to make political capital at the expense of the government.   
 
Similarly the party’s commitment to reduce direct income taxes was 
compromised and undermined by a debate over alleged comments by 
Treasury spokesperson Oliver Letwin.  Letwin had reportedly suggested 
Conservative public spending plans would probably mean something like 20 
rather than the publicised 8 billion pounds worth of cuts.  In the confusion 
Labour were resolute in restating their commitment to maintaining public 
spending levels.  Once again the most telling criticisms of government policy 
came from sympathetic critics such as Ruth Lister keen to see ministers 
abandon their ‘Middle England strategy’ and consider raising taxes (Lister, 
2001; and also Dilnot, 2001). 
 
 
The ‘Controllables’:  imagery. 
A major, if not most important, outcome of Labour’s embrace of marketing has 
been the diminution of internal debate and almost total centralisation of 
authority within the leadership.  Entering the 2001 race Millbank’s objective 
was to present a united front to the media and electorate.  Significantly the 
practice of constantly prefixing Labour’s name with the word ‘New’, a key 
symbol of Blair’s leadership, was abandoned.  Interestingly a recurrent feature 
of the subsequent campaign was the way the image of party unity was 
challenged not by the Conservatives but by internal dissenters. 
 
Most prominent of the unseemly internal disputes was the selection of former 
Conservative frontbencher turned Labour MP Shaun Woodward as a 
candidate for the predominantly working-class seat of St Helens South 
following the sudden retirement of Gerry Bermingham, the sitting Member.  
Woodward’s past allegiances combined with his publicised personal wealth 
attracted unwelcome media scrutiny.  Nominally a local issue the national 
party became embroiled in the selection process following a Millbank 
sanctioned panel’s decision to omit several other well known candidates 
including the local council leader Marie Rimmer from the final shortlist.   
 
Shaun Woodward’s subsequent victory and the manner by which it was 
achieved were roundly condemned as a display of leadership ‘control 
freakery’.  This in turn led allies in the labour movement such as the Fire 
Brigades Union to publicly declare it would review its financial support for the 
party.  They like ex-minister and former Blair ally Peter Kilfoyle were 
questioning of the party’s acceptance of million pound donations from wealthy 
supporters such as Lords Hamlyn and Sainsbury.  This in a climate of 
increased public scrutiny of political sleaze and campaign spending caps of 
£20 million. 
 
In another potentially compromising development the admission by MP Mark 
Fisher that he had been offered a peerage to stand down just before the 
election raised serious doubts about the integrity of the party and its 
democratic propriety.  The likely beneficiaries of this patronage, presumed to 
be Millbank endorsed candidates, were the type of people former party aide 
Derek Draper had in mind when he publicly attacked many Blairite 
parliamentarians as ‘talentless careerists’.  If this wasn’t enough, Millbank 
actually sanctioned internal conflict by allowing elections for the party’s 
National Executive Committee to go ahead.  At best a distraction to a 
membership fighting the Conservatives, this unnecessary campaign 
encouraged intra-party tensions at the worst possible time of all. 
 
Turning to leadership image, Blair was comfortably ahead of his main rival 
Hague in successive public opinion polls.  Focus groups by Labour’s 
marketing consultant Philip Gould had long identified the Opposition leader as 
a major weakness (Gould, 2001).  Competitive advantage over his rival was 
an obvious benefit to the Prime Minister as was the fact that the increasingly 
popular Liberal Democrat Charles Kennedy led a party that targeted most of 
its efforts against the Conservatives in key marginal seats.  The fact that 
Hague appeared in more Labour advertisements than for his own party spoke 
volumes about his public image.  When the Conservatives tried to contrast his 
personal integrity against Blair’s alleged lack of this quality they resolutely 
failed to convince the electorate. 
 
Central to Blair’s personal appeal was his image as a family man.  It was 
notable that his son, Euan, made at least one appearance at a party event in 
support of his father.  Similarly his mother, Cherie Booth, proved an active 
campaigner.  She was also a valuable one who, unlike William Hague’s 
partner Ffion, gave a keynote speech during the campaign.  It was significant 
that Ms Booth’s appearance to present the main honour on ITV’s British Soap 
Awards was watched by 11 million while simultaneously a mere 2.5 million 
watched her husband’s cross-examination on BBC1’s Question Time 
Leadership Special.  Though not political, the appearance of the Prime 
Minister’s wife served as an obvious reminder of the Blair image for viewers 
who had opted to watch a non-election programme and whom, by their very 
nature, were a difficult but important audience of voters to reach.   
 
 
The ‘Controllables’:  promotions. 
TBWA’s pre-campaign advertising stressed government achievements through 
‘The Work Goes On’ theme.  This in turn had followed the ‘Thank You’ posters 
featuring perceived beneficiaries expressing their gratitude to Labour’s 1997 
voters for policies such as the New Deal programme.  Following the 
announcement of the election, the campaign began to use more negative or 
‘knocking’ copy.  The most memorable images featured William Hague.  ‘Just 
William’ used a picture of Hague from the time he made his first Conservative 
conference speech when only a teenager.  The image suggested a precocious 
schoolboy debater in the mould of comedian Harry Enfield’s reviled ‘Tory Boy’ 
character.   
 
Labour strategists were keen to suggest Hague was a clone of Margaret 
Thatcher (Gould, 2001).  A striking advert featuring Thatcher’s hairstyle 
superimposed on the balding leader’s head amplified this attack.  The image 
was recycled in media debates as to its appropriateness thereby guaranteeing 
additional coverage.  Negativity also featured in classic Hollywood horror film 
styled posters replete with anti-Tory slogans like ‘Economic Disaster II’ and 
‘The Repossessed’.  Similar ideas were incorporated into a Party Election 
Broadcast featuring a cinema type commercial attacking the Conservatives. 
 
Conscious of the need to cultivate younger and first time voters Labour 
employed new technologies such as text messaging and the Internet.  
Potential supporters were targeted with slogans and a website called ‘R U up 
4 it?’.  Labour also successfully pre-publicised a PEB on government 
achievements by revealing the guest appearance of pop singer Geri Halliwell.  
Conveniently for Halliwell this exposure coincided with the release of her new 
record.  More embarrassing was the allegation that the singer was not actually 
registered to vote on security grounds and would therefore not be acting upon 
on her stated support for Tony Blair, a politician she had previously denounced 
as a ‘marketing man’.   
 
A similar controversy engulfed the final PEB featuring two celebrities from 
youth soap opera Hollyoaks.  This unsophisticated film targeted young voters 
by showing the actors being thanked by various people for taking the trouble 
to support Labour.  The message was undermined when a front page Sun 
story suggested one of those involved, Terri Dwyer, was unable to vote 
because she was ‘too busy’.  Labour’s sure touch over ‘controlled’ 
communications had apparently deserted it.  More importantly the actor’s 
admission clearly undermined efforts to mobilise first time voters. 
 
If some of the party’s advertising caused it problems then there were also 
problems with the public relations side of the campaign.  High profile 
embarrassments involving Blair, Prescott and Straw in hostile encounters with 
members of the public over health, country sports and police reform were to 
some extent unexpected.  In fact the party’s news management under Alastair 
Campbell and others dealt with each of these incidents reasonably well.  That 
said a letter from Labour General Secretary Margaret McDonagh accusing 
broadcasters of colluding with protestors was ill judged; it inevitably became a 
topic of public debate.  Similarly problematic were many of the proactive media 
initiatives, most notoriously the launch of the campaign by Blair in which he 
appeared at a school preaching to the pupils.   
 
Following on from the poorly received campaign launch successive Labour 
photo-opportunities were subjected to media scrutiny.  Particular criticism was 
made of an artificial meeting in Leamington between Blair and some 
supporters.  This and other stunts led Blair’s own constituency agent John 
Burton to question why aides were not letting the real leader campaign.  
Similar criticisms were made of the excessive control of party news 
conferences.  Gordon Brown, regularly in the chair for these events, was 
accused of sexism following the party’s persistent failure to let women 
politicians speak from the platform.  But a more telling and forthright 
observation came from Chris Powell, a former party advertising adviser and 
Mandelson’s former colleague in the 1987 and 1997 campaigns.  He was 
clearly concerned about more than presentation: 
‘The concentration by the public and the media on the packaging rather 
than the product can only fuel a cynicism that it is all a game.  
Everywhere artifice, nothing natural and true to itself.  This, combined 
with the poll-fed impression that it is in the bag, could lead to record 
levels of abstention’ (Powell, 2001). 
 
 
The ‘Controllables’:  place 
The fact that Labour designated its 2001 campaign Operation Turnout rather 
than something similar to the 1997 label Operation Victory reflected a central 
strategic concern.  As one organiser admitted:  ‘The size of our majority will 
depend on a high turnout’ (Wintour, 2001).  From December 1999 resources 
were concentrated on defending the 90 key seats targeted and won at the last 
general election.  But the main concern was that stay at home voters might 
cost Labour the other 66 ‘far side’ constituencies the party unexpectedly 
gained in 1997 (Cook, 2001).  Public recognition that there might be difficulties 
in mobilising the core vote came with a well publicised eve of poll visit by Blair 
to Pontefract and Castleford, Labour’s fourteenth safest seat (majority of over 
62% in 1997).  This reflected real concern over whether the party’s traditional 
working-class constituency would bother to participate in the election.  
Ironically peculiarities in the electoral system helped Labour retain just about 
all of these 146 ‘priority’ seats following a slight swing to the Conservatives. 
 
In the months leading up to the general election Millbank had made 
preparations for the eventual announcement of the polling date.  When Blair 
called the election Labour strategists immediately launched a plan of action.  
This began with an attempt to contact around 50% of the electorate living in 
the battleground constituencies in order to identify potential vote switchers and 
doubtfuls.  Central to this effort was the party’s new call centre at Tyneside in 
the north east of England.  This facility’s ability to contact up to 10,000 voters 
each night provided Labour with a valuable means of strategic self-promotion 
as well as instant electoral feedback (Travis and Maguire, 2001).  Similar 
efforts were put into organising a direct mail campaign (Seyd, 2001). 
 
300,000 voters in over 60 battleground seats were sent professionally edited 
videos featuring the actor and Labour National Executive member Tony 
Robinson introducing the local Labour candidate together with sympathisers 
talking about themselves and their community (Denver et al., 2001).  Another 
key aspect of local efforts were blitz canvasses in which Labour MPs limited 
their time with each household to 30 seconds in order to maximise exposure. 
 
Labour’s attention to detail was remarked upon by a number of those national 
journalists on the Blair battlebus.  Acknowledging the potential importance of 
regional press and broadcasting networks, the Labour press machine 
developed a strong sub-national PR effort and took care to cultivate these 
media with relative concern and diplomacy.  By contrast national journalists 
attending on the battlebus felt they got little for their expensive tickets and 
were annoyed by their perceived lack of access to Blair and his campaign.  In 
an election campaign marked by perceived voter disengagement the party 
privileged regional and local media as potentially fruitful avenues to reach an 
apparently bored public.   
 
 
Conclusions 
Martin Harrop and has termed the 2001 general election the ‘apathetic 
landslide’.  That said Harrop points to three particular legacies of this most 
predictable campaign, namely the debate over Labour’s plans for public 
service provision, the striking decline in electoral voter turnout, and the marked 
bias in the electoral system towards the governing party.  In past elections 
these factors might have most damaged Labour’s electoral prospects.  This 
was not the case in 2001.  If the electoral system worked against the 
Conservatives they were virtually sidelined during the debate over Tony Blair’s 
defence of public-private partnerships in the delivery of government services.  
Here the most telling critiques came from government sympathisers.  Even the 
serious decline in (disproportionately Labour) voter participation failed to harm 
the party’s prospects.  This may not be the case in the future. 
 The growing marketing colonisation of modern campaigning has had a major 
impact on political life and, in particular, Labour.  It is perhaps ironic that, at the 
very same time that the party has been one of the most committed to spending 
more time and resources on understanding the public, voters are less likely to 
participate in elections.  That said political marketing techniques are less about 
understanding the electorate as a whole and more about cultivating and 
maintaining support within key segments of the populace.  Thus parties use of 
such methods for their own strategic ends can and does often conflict with the 
goals of fostering a healthy democratic debate and maximising electoral 
participation.  Though Labour ultimately triumphed at the election, Millbank’s 
Operation Turnout was neither a success in terms of mobilising core 
supporters nor capturing the public imagination.  In the absence of an effective 
opposition the party won the campaign almost by default.  That said the real 
challenge of convincing the electorate of government plans may now begin. 
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